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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
SERGIO RENAGA-GUTIERREZ, : Case No. 20010141-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his conviction for distributing, agreeing, consenting, offering or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine), a second degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (Supp. 2001), in the Third Judicial District Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
/. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for directed verdict where 
competent evidence supported each element of the charged offense? 
A denial of a motion for directed verdict is reversed "only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, [the appellate court] conclude[s] that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 2001 UT 77, H 33, 31 P.3d 557 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Evidence 
is insufficient only if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is 
"wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports 
the prosecution's claim." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 12, 20 P.3d 300. 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's requested lesser-offense 
instructions on attempted possession of a controlled substance and criminal solicitation? 
A trial court's denial of a requested instruction is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^ f 11,6 P.3d 1116. A defendant is 
entitled to a lesser-included instruction only if: (1) the requested offense is legally included 
in the charged offense; and (2) the evidence provides a rational basis for the jury to acquit 
the defendant of the greater offense and, at the same time, convict him of the lesser. Id. at 
1 12 (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah 1983)). 
3. Did the trial court properly overrule defendant's objections to the prosecutor fs 
closing argument and instruct the jury that comments of counsel are not evidence? 
A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will 
result in reversal only if: (1) the objected-to comment improperly called the jury's attention 
to a matter it could not properly consider; and (2) the improper remark substantially and 
prejudicially affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, % 22, 999 P.2d 7. 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Copies of the following provisions, and any other provision cited in the body of this 
brief, are included in Addendum A: 
2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp 2001) - Prohibited [Drug] Acts -
Penalties, 
U T \ H CODE ANN § 76-4-101 (1999) - Attempt - Elements of Offense, 
U T \ H CODE ANN § 76-4-203 (1999) - Criminal Solicitation - Elements, 
SALT LAKE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE § 11 12 100 - Solicitation of Person (s) 
with Intent to Have Another Commit an Offense Specified in Section 58-
37-8, Utah Code Annotated 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In August 2000, defendant was charged with distribution of cocaine (R 5-6) ' 
Following a jury trial on December 6-7,2000, defendant was convicted (R 101-03,128-29) 
On January 29, 2001, he was sentenced to the statutory pnson term of one-to-fifteen-years 
(R 139) Defendant timely appealed (R. 143) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Suspected Drug Dealing in the Men ys Room 
Late at night on August 13,2000, undercover detective Brian Purvis, with three other 
Salt Lake City vice officers, entered a bar to investigate reported underage dnnking (R 160 
23-25,62) At the door, one of the bar's pnvate secunty guards told Purvis "he felt like there 
were drugs being dealt in the men's room" (R 160 26) 
Purvis entered the men's room to investigate (R.160. 27) He immediately noticed 
1
 The term"distnbution" is used in this bnef as "shorthand for all the vanations of 
culpable behavior listed m" section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(n) (prohibiting distnbuting, agreeing, 
consenting, offenng, or arranging to distnbute a controlled substance) See State v. 
Hester, 2000 UT App 159,1 1 n 1, 3 P 3d 725. cert denied, 9 P 3d 170 
2
 Except as otherwise noted, the facts are recited m the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  2, 12 P 3d 92 
3 
defendant, who was dressed differently from the majority of the 200 western-clad bar patrons 
(R.160: 27-28, 30-31). Defendant and another man were talking "right in the center of the 
men's room," not "at the toilets or the sink or the mirror or anything" (R. 160: 27, 29-31). 
"As soon as [the detective] walked in they stopped and turned around and walked out the 
door" (id.)? 
Purvis left the restroom and went to the bar area to watch for underage drinkers 
(R.160: 32-33, 64). About ten to fifteen minutes later, Purvis saw defendant re-enter the 
men's room followed by two men (R. 160:35). Purvis believed that if he followed, defendant 
would just "leave again like last time" (id.). As he tried to think of "some other way to 
approach it," another officer told Purvis he was needed in the parking lot (id). 
Observed Hand-to-Hand Drug Transaction in Parking Lot 
In the bar's parking lot, Purvis and two undercover officers checked for unauthorized 
drinking (R. 160: 36-38, 79). As Purvis walked down the first row of cars, he saw defendant 
walk from the bar into the parking lot. Defendant was "leading" a man, subsequently 
identified as Ignacio Perez-Acevedo, who was walking behind him (R.160: 39-40, 42, 65). 
Defendant stopped behind a parked windowless delivery truck and turned to face Acevedo 
(R. 160: 41 -42). The two were not in the open and apparently did not notice Purvis; but with 
the help of street lights shining over his back, Purvis could clearly see defendant and 
3
 Others were using the men's room, but they had no interaction with defendant 
and walked out with Purvis after defendant left (R.160: 32-33, 63). 
4 
Acevedo (R.160: 42-43). 
Defendant and Acevedo placed all four of their hands down low and between them, 
like a "two-handed handshake" (R.160: 43-44,67). The two did not look at each other, only 
down at their hands (R.160: 43). Purvis could see that they held something in their hands, 
but initially could not tell what it was (R.160: 59, 71-72). 
"Defendant pulled his left hand out and [Purvis] could tell at that point [defendant] 
had cash" in his hand (R.160: 44, 59). Even though Purvis had not seen the money in 
Acevedo's hand before seeing it in defendant's, from their gestures, it "definitely" appeared 
that Acevedo was "handing money" to defendant (R. 160:70).4 At the same time, defendant' s 
right hand stayed between Acevedo's two hands (R.160: 44). Purvis had "no doubt" that a 
"hand-to-hand" drug transaction was occurring and waved to the other detectives (R. 160:44, 
47, 59, 67, 75, 80). Defendant and Acevedo looked "straight at" the detective and stepped 
away from each other (R.160: 45, 68). As their hands separated, Purvis could see a "flash 
of white" in Acevedo's right hand (R.160: 45, 59, 73). 
Defendant and Acevedo walked in opposite directions (R.160: 48, 68). Purvis 
confronted Acevedo; the other detectives stopped defendant (R.160: 46). 
Purvis told Acevedo to put his hands on the hood of a nearby car (R. 160: 46,49, 69). 
Acevedo put his left hand on the hood but kept his right hand, which held the white object, 
in his right pocket (R.160: 46). Purvis told him several times to remove his hand. Finally, 
4
 The detective demonstrated what he saw to the jury (R.160: 44, 60). 
5 
Purvis grabbed Acevedo's right hand, placed it on the hood, patted Acevedo's pocket, felt 
a bump, reached in "just an inch or so," and pulled out a white plastic bag containing a 
"twist" of cocaine (R.160: 46, 50, 74).* Subsequently, during a more complete jail search, 
two more "twists" were discovered farther down in the same pocket (R.160: 52-53, 76).6 
Contemporaneous with Purvis's arrest of Acevedo, Detectives Woodbury and Martin 
arrested defendant (R.160: 46, 81). The cash Purvis observed was still in defendant's left 
hand (R. 160: 82). Additionally, a thick "wad" of half-folded bills was in defendant's pocket 
and a "significant" amount of cash was found in his wallet (R.160: 83-84). All total, 
defendant was carrying $1426.00 in cash, primarily in tens and twenties (R.160: 83-85).7 
Based on Purvis's experience, both as an observer and as an undercover participant 
in other drug transactions, the detective concluded that defendant and Acevedo were 
involved in 
a hand-to-hand transaction. . . It seemed very plain to me that Mr. Gutierrez, 
the defendant, since he was taking the money away was the seller and that Mr. 
Acevedo, since he ended up with the drugs, would be the buyer. 
(R.160: 47-48). 
5
 A "twist" is normal street packaging for cocaine. It contains about half a gram 
of cocaine and sells on average for $20.00 but may run as high as $40.00. (R.160: 50). 
6
 A total of 1.4 grams of cocaine was found on Acevedo (R.160: 51). 
Due to a computer "glitch," the officers did not record the exact denominations 
of the money seized from defendant (R.160: 89-90). 
6 
Defendant's Claim of Innocence 
Defendant never personally explained what he was doing in the parking lot or why he 
was carrying a multitude of tens and twenties in his hand, pocket, and wallet. Nevertheless, 
through his mother and Acevedo, defendant claimed he was innocent. 
By the time of defendant's trial, Acevedo had pled guilty to "having drugs in my 
pocket" (R.160: 104).8 He was awaiting deportation and admitted that he had "nothing to 
gain or lose" by what he said at trial (R. 160: 111). According to Acevedo, he purchased the 
drugs found on him from a different person at a different location earlier that evening (R. 160: 
100). Acevedo testified that no drug sale or attempted drug purchase occurred in the parking 
lot, no drugs or money were exchanged, and neither Acevedo nor defendant offered to sell 
drugs to the other (R.160: 101-04). Acevedo claimed that he did not leave the bar with 
defendant but admitted that he was walking behind defendant in the parking lot and 
approached him (R. 160: 101,110). Acevedo did not have a car, but defendant "had his car" 
in the parking lot (R.160: 110). Acevedo claimed they never discussed drugs but only 
engaged in social conversation (R.160: 110). When defendant turned to say good-bye, the 
police arrested them because, in Acevedo's words, they looked "suspicious" (R.160: 102, 
110). 
Defendant's mother claimed that two days before to his arrest, defendant sold a car 
8
 Pursuant to a plea bargain, Acevedo pled guilty to a reduced charge of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance, was sentenced to six months in jail, and agreed to be 
deported (R.160: 106, 123). 
7 
to his uncle for S2000.00 (R.160: 114-16).9 The sale took place at the mother's home, where 
defendant lived (R. 160: 114-15). The mother did not know what her son had done with the 
alleged sale proceeds and had no idea what, if any, monies her son carried on him (R.160: 
114). 
The jury rejected defendant's claim of innocence and convicted him of distribution 
of a controlled substance (R. 128; R.160: 153). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Denial of Directed Verdict: The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
directed verdict. The prosecution presented competent evidence to support each element of 
distribution. While defendant argues that the State's evidence should not be believed and 
supports other inferences, that is not the test. Instead, a directed verdict is permissible only 
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of supporting the prosecution's case. 
Here, an experienced undercover officer witnessed what he characterized as a hand-to-
hand drug transaction. As defendant, the seller, walked away from the transaction, he was 
arrested with money in his hand and substantial monies on his person. Walking in the 
opposite direction, Acevedo, the buyer, had three twists of cocaine in his pocket. This 
evidence was sufficient to submit the case to a jury. 
While Acevedo claimed no drug sale occurred - only a friendly conversation - the 
9
 No verification of the sale was produced. 
8 
jury was entitled to disregard that testimony and accept the observations of the police 
detective, which were fully supported by the physical evidence found on defendant and 
Acevedo at the time of their arrests. 
In sum, defendant's conviction is supported by sufficient, and what the jury 
determined to be credible, evidence. 
Refusal to Give Lesser Offense Instructions: A defendant is entitled to a jury 
instruction on a lesser offense only if: (1) the requested instruction is legally included in the 
charged offense; and (2) the evidence provides a rational basis for the jury to acquit the 
defendant of the greater offense and, at the same time, convict him of the lesser. Here, the 
tnal court correctly concluded that no evidence supported the inference that defendant, rather 
than Acevedo, was purchasing drugs and, therefore, properly denied defendant's request for 
lesser instructions. Detective Purvis testified that he observed defendant sell drugs to 
Acevedo. Acevedo denied buying any drugs from defendant but also testified that defendant 
never attempted to buy any drugs from him. Thus, acceptance of the State's evidence 
supported conviction as charged, while acceptance of the defense evidence required acquittal 
of any drug charge. 
Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct: During closing argument, defense counsel 
objected to three statements by the prosecutor concerning his views of the defense evidence. 
The tnal court properly overruled defendant's objections and reminded the jury of the court's 
pnor instruction that comments of counsel were not evidence. Defendant has failed to 
9 
establish that the court abused its discretion in ruling on the objections, or if any alleged error 
occurred, that the error was prejudicial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A DETECTIVE OBSERVED A HAND-TO-HAND DRUG TRANSACTION 
AFTER WHICH DEFENDANT, THE SELLER, WAS FOUND IN 
POSSESSION OF MONEY AND THE BUYER WAS FOUND IN 
POSSESSION OF COCAINE; BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict 
because "[notwithstanding the fact that [defendant] was seen associating with someone later 
found to be in possession of three twists of cocaine, there is not a sufficient nexus between 
[defendant] and the drugs," and "any connection between [defendant] and the drugs [found 
on Acevedo] is too speculative and conjectural to legally support the inference of intent [to 
distribute]. Brief of Appellant [Br. Aplt.] at 19-20. Defendant's argument misconstrues the 
requisite elements of distribution and is contrary to a fair interpretation of the evidence. 
(A) Defendant Has Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence. 
A denial of a motion for directed verdict is reversed "only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, [the appellate court] conclude[s] that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 2001 UT 77, ^  33, 31 P.3d 557 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Evidence 
is insufficient only if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is 
10 
"wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports 
the prosecution's claim." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,1 12, 20 P.3d 300. 
As a prerequisite to consideration of his evidentiary challenge, defendant must first 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling and then demonstrate that "all the 
evidence" in support of the prosecution's claims would not support conviction. See Brewer, 
2001 UT 77, |^ 33 (citations omitted). So long as "some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt," the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict must be 
affirmed. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, J 13 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Here, defendant purports to marshal the evidence, see Br.Aplt. at 11-13, but fails to 
present the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution or acknowledge the 
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
findings the appellant resists. After construing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that 
the [trial] court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ^  24,973 P.2d 431, (citation and quotation marks omitted), 
cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89. In essence, defendant's argument on appeal is no more than his 
argument below: the detective was "mistaken" in what he saw. Compare Br.Aplt. at 14-15, 
11 
with R. 160: 21 & R. 161: 134. But merely rearguing claims rejected by the jury does not 
satisfy the marshaling requirement or provide a basis to reverse a jury verdict. See Moon. 
1999 UT App 12,124; see also State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30,116,25 P.3d 985 (the "existence 
of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences" does not undermine the validity of a 
verdict). 
Defendant's failure to properly marshal the evidence permits this Court to summarily 
reject his argument. Even if the Court considers the substance of defendant's challenge, his 
argument is meritless. 
(B) Defendant Misconstrues the Elements of Distribution. 
In attacking the trial court's denial of his motion for directed verdict - and, implicitly, 
the underlying sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict - defendant misinterprets 
the elements of distribution of a controlled substance, the crime of which defendant was 
convicted. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (Supp. 2001) states that it is unlawful to 
knowingly and intentionally "distribute a controlled substance . . . , or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled . . . substance." See Addendum Afar copies of 
cited statutes. "Distribute" means "to deliver," which, in turn, is defined as "the actual 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
2(1 )(i) & (n) (1998). Distribution does not require proof of possession: it requires proof of 
a transfer or attempted transfer. Cf State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159,1<| 9-10, 3 P.3d 725 
(discussing elements of arranging, a variation of distribution), cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170. 
12 
Nevertheless, defendant attempts to add to the statutory definition of distribution an 
additional element-actual or constructive possession. SeeBr.Aplt. at 14 & 19-20. In doing 
so, defendant confuses the elements of distribution, defined in subsection 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii), 
with the separate crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, set 
out in subsection 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii). See Addendum A. Unlike distribution, possession with 
intent to distribute requires proof of actual or constructive possession. See State v. Layman, 
1999 UT 79, Tf 13,985 P.2d 911 (reversing conviction for possession with intent to distribute 
where the evidence of actual or constructive possession of the controlled substance was 
insufficient) See also United States v. Jackson, 213 F 3d 1269,1294(10th Cir.), (contrasting 
elements of distribution with elements of possession with intent to distribute), cert, denied, 
531 U.S. 1038(2000). 
Defendant's reliance on Layman, 1999 UT 79, is misplaced. Unlike defendant, 
Layman was convicted of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at^ f 1. Both Utah appellate 
courts reversed Layman's conviction because the only evidence to support the requisite 
element of possession was that Layman gestured to his traveling companion, who physically 
possessed the drugs, not to consent to a search when they were stopped by the police. Id. at 
1H13-9 & 16. Because the crime of distribution was not at issue, Layman's holding is neither 
factually nor legally applicable to this case. 
Similarly, Hester, 2000 UT App 159, while a distribution case, does not support 
defendant's argument that evidence of possession is required for conviction. Hester was 
13 
charged with arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a variation of distribution 
contained in the same subsection. Id. at ^ 1 & n.l. Hester agreed to sell cocaine to an 
undercover officer, took her money, and left. Id. at f 2. He was arrested a few blocks away, 
walking in the opposite direction of the officer without any drugs in his possession. Id. at 
Tj 3. This Court affirmed the magistrate's refusal to bmdover, concluding that the preliminary 
hearing evidence did not support an inference that Hester intended to distribute drugs - only 
that he took money under the pretext of distributing drugs. In analyzing the elements of 
section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(n), the Court recognized that distribution does not require proof of 
actual or constructive possession of drugs; it only requires proof that the defendant's intent 
was to distnbute drugs. Id. at f 9. And while that intent might be inferred from actual or 
constructive possession of drugs, it might also be established through a wide range of other 
evidence. Id. at fflj 9-12. "Even an aborted transaction can serve as the basis for an 
'arranging' conviction, if the surrounding facts indicated that the defendant had intended to 
facilitate a completed drug sale." Id. at |^ 12. 
In the present case, the jury accepted the evidence that an actual sale occurred. Thus, 
under Hester, the evidence of a completed transaction was more than sufficient to support 
a conviction under section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). 
(C) Competent Evidence Supports Each Element of Distribution 
As previously discussed, distribution of a controlled substance requires proof that 
defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed, that is delivered or attempted to deliver. 
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a controlled substance. See discussion, Subsection (B), supra. When the evidence in this 
case is properly marshaled, competent evidence supports each element of the crime. The trial 
court, therefore, properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict. See Brewer, 2001 
UT 77, K 33; Clark, 2001 UT 9, J 12. 
Detective Purvis, an experienced vice officer, was directed to the men's room by the 
bar's security guard who suspected that drug sales were occurring there (R. 160: 26-27). The 
bar was crowded with approximately 200 patrons, almost all of whom were dressed in 
western clothing (R.160: 27-28, 30-31). As Purvis entered the men's room, his focus was 
drawn to defendant for three reasons: (1) he was not dressed like the rest of the bar patrons, 
(2) he did not appear to be using the bathroom for normal purposes, but was standing in the 
middle of the room talking to another man, and (3) he and the other man immediately stopped 
their conversation and left when Purvis entered (R. 160: 29-31). About 10-15 minutes later, 
defendant re-entered the bathroom followed by two other men (R. 160: 35). A few minutes 
later, defendant left the bar followed by yet another man (R.160: 36-40). 
When Detective Purvis observed defendant in the parking lot, it appeared that 
defendant was "leading" Acevedo away from the bar and to a somewhat secluded area of the 
parking lot, behind a parked windowless delivery truck (R. 160:40-42). Once they were "not 
in the open," defendant stopped and turned around to face Acevedo (R. 160: 40-43). Without 
apparent conversation, the men placed their four hands down low and between them (R. 160: 
43-44, 67). They continued to look down at their grasped hands (R.160: 43). Acevedo 
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appeared to be handing defendant something (R.160: 44, 59-60, 70-72). When defendant 
removed his left hand from Acevedo's two hands, defendant had money in it (R. 160:44, 59). 
Keeping the money in his withdrawn hand, defendant continued to hold his right hand 
between Acevedo's hands (R.160: 44). An object still appeared to be in their joined hands 
(id.). The two men dropped their hands and separated (R.160: 45, 59, 73). As Acevedo 
walked away, he had a white object hidden in his right hand (id.). Defendant walked in the 
opposite direction with the money still in his left hand (R.160: 48, 68, 82). 
Purvis immediately arrested Acevedo, who, despite repeated demands, refused to 
remove his right hand from his pocket (R.160: 46, 49, 69). Eventually, three twists of 
cocaine were discovered hidden in the pocket (R.160: 46, 50-53, 74, 76). Defendant was 
contemporaneously arrested. In addition to the money in his hand, cash was in his pocket 
and wallet (R.160: 82-84). In total, slightly over $1400.00, primarily in tens and twenties, 
was recovered from defendant (R. 160: 83-85). A twist of cocaine commonly sells for S20.00 
to $40.00 on the street (R.160: 50). 
Defendant assails Detective Purvis's testimony as "inconsistent," Br.Aplt. at 15, but 
the record belies the claim. The deteptive was questioned concerning any discrepancies 
between his written report, preliminary hearing testimony, and trial testimony. He explained 
that he always tried to accurately describe what he saw, but that his report was "very 
generalized" as compared to his preliminary hearing testimony which was "much more 
specific," although still limited (R.160: 61, 72-73, 77). Despite some differences in the 
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report and testimonies, the detective was "positive" that defendant had money in his hand and 
Acevedo had the "white package" as the two walked away from each other (R 160* 61) 
Indeed, he was emphatic: 
In my experience101 had no doubt that it was a hand-to-hand transaction. It 
seemed very plain to me that Mr. Gutierrez, the defendant, since he was taking 
the money away was the seller and that Mr. Acevedo, since he ended up with 
the drugs, would be the buyer. 
(R 160- 48-48) The detective also physically demonstrated what he observed to the jury and 
testified, "I saw this defendant pull the money from the hands of both defendants in his left 
hand" (R 160: 59), and on cross-examination, confirmed that he saw Acevedo "definitely 
handing money" to defendant (R.160: 70).n The detective further clarified that after 
defendant's left hand with the money "came up" and away from Acevedo, defendant's nght 
hand remained down between Acevedo's two hands "holding an object between them" 
(R. 160. 59). As the two pulled away from each other, Acevedo closed his hand into a "fist" 
over the "white object," which was fully m Acevedo's hand as he walked away (R. 160* 59-
60). 
Even if some inconsistencies existed between Purvis's written report and his 
The detective explained that he had not only observed other drug transactions 
but had also directly participated m one as an undercover officer (R.160: 47). 
1 ]
 On cross-examination, the detective agreed that "I didn't see who had the 
money alone when I first walked up. I didn't see one person take money out of their 
pocket It was being held between them as I approached" (R.160: 72). Nevertheless, he 
explained that defendant's actions "definitely" made it appear he was withdrawing money 
from Acevedo's hands (R.160. 70). 
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testimonies, inconsistencies do not provide a basis to question the sufficiency of the 
evidence. See Boyd, 2001 UT 30, % 14 ("When reviewing a trial wherein conflicting, 
competent evidence was presented, [the appellate court] simply assume[s] that the jury 
believed the evidence supporting the verdict.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant also claims the State's evidence was insufficient because it was disputed 
by Acevedo, who testified that no drug sale or discussion occurred, and defendant's mother, 
who opined that if defendant had cash, it must be from the sale of his car two days before. 
Br.Aplt. at 14-15. See also Statement of Facts, supra, Thejury was entitled to disregard that 
testimony and accept as credible the detective's observations, which were supported by the 
physical evidence. See State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281-82 (Utah App. 1998) ("the 
existence of one or more alternate reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the 
jury from concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt") (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
In sum, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. The trial court, 
therefore, properly refused to direct the verdict in defendant's favor. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE ONLY SUPPORTED CONVICTION OF 
DISTRIBUTION OR ACQUITTAL OF ANY CHARGE, THE TRIAL 
COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER OFFENSES 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request for lesser included 
offense instructions on attempted possession of a controlled substance, in violation of UTAH 
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CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(Supp. 2001), or, alternatively, on "solicitation of a person(s) 
with intent to have another commit an offense specified in [UTAH CODE ANN. §] 58-37-8/' 
in violation of SALT LAKE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE 11.12.100. BrAplt. at 20. Theargument 
lacks support. 
A trial court's denial of a requested jury instruction is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^ | 11,6 P.3d 1116. "When a lesser 
included instruction is requested by the defendant, the trial court must apply an 'evidence-
based' standard to decide whether the instruction is appropriate." Id. at f 12. Under this 
standard, a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included instruction only if: (1) the requested 
offense is legally included in the charged offense; and (2) the evidence provides a rational 
basis for the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense and, at the same time, convict 
him of the lesser. Id. (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah 1983)). In 
determining if a "rational basis" exists, the trial court must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the defense. Id. at ^ 14. 
The evidence-based standard recognizes that a defendant does not have the right to 
a compromise verdict. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157-58. Nor does a jury "have the right to find 
a fact and then refuse to render the verdict which such a finding necessarily requires." State 
v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The 
evidence-based standard compels a trial court to "avoid doing anything, such as submitting 
lower crimes in an inappropriate case, that would constitute an invitation to the jury to 
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foreswear its duty and return a compromise or otherwise unwarranted verdict." Id. (citation 
and quotation marks omitted). In sum, where the prosecution's evidence supports conviction 
and defendant's evidence acquittal, no lesser included offense instruction is warranted. See 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984); Crick, 675 P.2d at 530-31; Baker, 671 
P.2d at 160. Cf. Lyman, 966 P.2d at 282 n.2 (recognizing that counsel may argue alternative 
reasonable hypotheses to the jury, but that a trial court is not required to instruct on those 
alternatives). In this case, the trial court properly applied these principles and refused 
defendant's lesser offense instructions. 
Defendant's theory was that he was innocent: the "defense's theory of the case is that 
what happened here is that the arresting officer saw something in the parking lot, two young 
Hispanic men, some sort of a handshake or some sort of hands together, and made an 
assumption about what he thought might be going on there, a mistaken assumption" (R. 160: 
21; R.161: 134).12 What the officer really saw, according to defense counsel, "was two 
friends, acquaintances, leaving the bar after the bar was closing, dancing was over, going to 
the parking lot, talking a little bit about the dance, shaking hands and saying good-bye" 
(R.161: 134).13 In support of the defense theory, Acevedo testified and denied any drug 
12
 Defense counsel apparently confused the officer's characterization of the bar as 
a Hispanic bar, with the officer's observations of defendant. Detective Purvis noticed 
defendant because he was dressed differently than the other 200 western-clad bar patrons 
and had acted suspiciously inside bar (R.160: 29-31, 35-40). 
n
 There is no evidence that the dance was over and the bar emptying when Purvis 
observed defendant and Acevedo in the parking lot. Purvis testified that the lot was still 
"pretty full" when he observed the two (R.160: 39). Purvis thought that they did not want 
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involvement with defendant, as buyer or seller. See Statement of Facts, supra. And 
defendant's mother provided, in counsel's words, an "innocent" explanation for the money 
found on defendant. See Statement of Facts, supra, & R.161: 145. Only as an aside in 
closing did defense counsel speculate that, assuming a drug transaction occurred, defendant 
was purchasing from, not selling to, Acevedo (R.161: 140-41). 
The trial court initially refused the request for any lesser offense instruction on purely 
legal grounds.14 Alternatively, the court addressed the lack of evidentiary support for the 
to go into the bathroom and had come to the parking lot for privacy (R.160: 41-42). 
14
 Initially, the court erroneously opined that attempted possession was not an 
independent crime, but a legal fiction (R.161: 123,125). While it is true that distribution 
includes within its definition attempted distribution, possession does not. Compare UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-2(i) & (n), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-2(dd) {Addendum A). 
Attempted possession of cocaine is a class A misdemeanor. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) & 76-4-102 (1999) (Addendum A). The error is inconsequential, however, 
because the court went on to consider whether the evidence supported a lesser-offense 
instruction on the theory that defendant was attempting to purchase the drugs found on 
Acevedo (R.161: 123-24). 
Additionally, the court properly rejected on legal grounds, defendant's request for 
an instruction on the municipal offense of solicitation (R.160: 122-23, 125). As the court 
recognized, inclusion of a city ordinance as a lesser included offense in a state felony 
prosecution raises jurisdictional issues (R.160: 122-23). State law permits a city 
prosecutor to prosecute some misdemeanor state crimes, State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 
889, 892-93 (Utah 1996), but a state prosecutor does not have the authority to prosecute 
violations of city ordinances. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-18-1.7 (2001), with UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-3-928 (1999) & SALT LAKE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE 2.08.040. See 
Addendum A for copies of cited provisions. The legislative power to create ordinances is 
vested with the municipal governing body. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-701 (1999). 
Accountability for the enforcement of ordinances runs directly form the city attorney as 
prosecutor to the municipal governing body. See SALT LAKE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE § 
2.08.040(A)(3). Revenues generated from enforcement also flow directly to the city. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-716 (1999). In contrast, the prosecuting party in a felony 
prosecution is the State of Utah, whose prosecutors have no accountability to the 
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requested instructions 
Analyzing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense, the trial court 
found that there was no "nexus" to establish that defendant "possessed" the cocaine found 
on Acevedo (R. 161: 124). Detective Purvis only saw the cocaine after the transaction was 
completed (R. 160: 59-60). By that point, defendant was walking one way with the money, 
while Acevedo was walking in the opposite direction with the drugs (id,) This evidence, 
while sufficient to support distnbution, would not support conviction of possession 
Defendant effectively concedes this point See Br.Aplt at 14 (arguing that trial court erred 
in not directing the verdict since State's evidence did not establish that defendant possessed 
the drugs) But see discussion, supra, at 12-14 (distnbution does not require proof of 
possession). 
The tnal court also found that there was no evidence "suggesting that this defendant 
intended - attempted to purchase a controlled substance" (R. 161:124). Therefore, there was 
no basis for instructions on either attempted possession or cnmmal solicitation.15 The court's 
municipality See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-18-1.7 & 77-1-5 (1999) Moreover, state 
statutes pre-empt municipal ordinances. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (Supp 2001) 
Thus, even if arguendo there was an evidentiary basis for a solicitation instruction, the 
instruction would not be pursuant to class B municipal solicitation, but pursuant to third 
degree felony cnminal solicitation of distribution. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-203 & -
204 (1999), and Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) & -(b)(i). 
^ Attempted possession requires a substantial step towards acquinng possession 
of cocaine. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1999). Cnmmal solicitation requires a 
request to have another commit any felony, m this case, distnbution. See UTAH CODE 
A w § 76-4-203. Municipal solicitation is limited to requests to have another commit a 
drug offense See SALT LAKE ORDINANCE 11.12.100 But see note 14, supra (defendant 
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finding is fully supported by the record. See Point I supra. The evidence supported no 
middle ground. Either defendant sold the drugs Acevedo possessed, as testified to by the 
detective, or defendant was not guilty of any crime, as claimed by Acevedo. Defendant was 
not, therefore, entitled to instructions on any lesser drug offense. See Shabata, 678 P.2d at 
790; Crick, 675 P.2d at 530-31; Baker, 671 P.2d at 160. 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT 
IN STATING HIS VIEWS OF THE EVIDENCE DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT; THE TRIAL COURT, THEREFORE, PROPERLY 
OVERRULED DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS AND CAUTIONED THE 
JURY THA T COMMENTS OF COUNSEL WERE NOT EVIDENCE 
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making "prejudicial 
and inappropriate remarks" during closing argument. Br.Aplt. at 34. Again, defendant's 
argument is meritless. 
Prosecutorial misconduct claims are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be 
reversed only if the defendant establishes that 
(1) the actions or remarks of counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter 
it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so, (2) 
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial 
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result. 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 22, 999 P.2d 7 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In 
making this assessment, the reviewing court must consider the objected-to comments in the 
not legally entitled to instruction on municipal ordinance in state felony prosecution). 
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context of the "arguments advanced by both sides as well as in [the] context of all the 
evidence," keeping in mind that "counsel for each side has considerable latitude in closing 
arguments and may discuss fully his or her viewpoint of the evidence and the deductions 
arising therefrom." State v. Bakalow 1999 UT 45, ^ 56, 979 P.2d 799. While a prosecutor 
should not express his personal opinion or personal knowledge of the facts, "a prosecutor 
may draw permissible deductions from the evidence and make assertions about what the jury 
may reasonably conclude from those deductions." Id. at % 57. He may also "fully discuss" 
these inferences and deductions with the jury. Id. at^ J 59. 
Prosecutorial misconduct is not established solely because a prosecutor makes an 
improper comment. In addition to establishing that an improper statement was made, a 
defendant must also show that the improper comment was "substantial" in that, absent the 
comment, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable for defendant. See Kohl, 
2000 UT 35, f 24. Three factors are considered: "the severity of the misconduct, the 
measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction absent the improper 
statements." United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173,1181 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 
U.S. 989 (1982). Cf. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ffl[ 56-60. 
In determining the severity of the misconduct, "[t]he first question is whether the 
improper comments were minor aberrations in a prolonged trial or cumulative evidence of 
a proceeding dominated by passion and prejudice." Modica, 663 F.2d at 1181 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). Elements to be weighed are the "extent to which the misconduct 
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was intentional and the extent to which the statements were made in response to defense 
contentions." Id, Accord State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 333-36 (Utah 1991) (recognizing 
necessity of a strong deterrent to "flagrant" or intentional misconduct, but ultimately finding 
the prosecutor's intentional misconduct harmless). Additionally, the reviewing court will 
consider any instructions given by the trial court. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1181. Accord KohL 
2000 UT 35, ffi[ 6 & 24 (concluding that improper remark was harmless where jury was 
formally instructed that comments of counsel were not evidence and the trial court 
immediately told the jury to "remember my admonition[, statements of the lawyers are not 
evidence in this case"). 
Here, no objections were made during the prosecutor's initial closing argument 
(R. 161: 126-34). See Addendum Bfor Closing Arguments. When defense counsel gave his 
closing argument, he attacked Detective Purvis's testimony (R.161: 134-37, 140-43), and 
then argued that Acevedo and defendant's mother provided "evidence that proves 
[defendant] is innocent of this charge" (R.161: 139, 145). 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor challenged defense counsel's portrayal of the quality of the 
defense evidence. The prosecutor's initial statements were objected to, one after the other: 
(1) "And what was the [sic] Ignacio's explanation? They were going to his 
car. The car they brought his mother in to tell you he had sold" (R.161: 147); 
(2) "Don't believe for [a] second that evidence of innocence. If they really 
wanted you to believe that he had sold the car and he had that money from the 
sale of the car, don't you think they would have brought in the bill of sale? 
Don't you think they'd have brought in a transfer of title?" (R.161: 148), and 
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(3) "Next, the testimony of Ignacio. He's admitted to you that he's a drug user 
for two years. He had used that night. And he was looking for more. He sat 
there and told you in no uncertain terms that there's really nothing we could 
do once he was deported and that, yes, he would lie for his friends" (id.). 
Each time, the court overruled the objection and reminded the jury of the court's prior formal 
instruction that arguments of counsel were not to be considered as evidence (R.161: 148-
49).16 The prosecutor continued his rebuttal argument and received one more objection, the 
propriety of which is not raised on appeal (R.161: 149-51). 
The prosecutor's first statement - in essence, that Acevedo and defendant's mother 
made conflicting statements about the same car - was a logical evidentiary deduction. See 
16
 The court formally instructed the jury: 
The lawyers, like you and myself, are officers of this court. It is the 
duty of each of them to present the evidence on behalf of their client and to 
make such objections as they deem proper and to fully argue the client's cause. 
You should, however, bear in mind that each of the lawyers is here in a 
partisan capacity, and it is both the duty and responsibility of each to be an 
advocate. If during the trial or in closing arguments the lawyers make 
statements concerning the evidence which do not conform with your 
recollection, you should disregard the statement and rely solely on your own 
recollection of the evidence. If either attorney's argument includes statements 
of the law which differ from the law I am now explaining, you should 
disregard such statements and rely entirely upon these instructions as given to 
you. 
(R. 123). The jurors were also instructed that they were the sole judges of the credibility and 
weight to be accorded any evidence (R. 121-23). In overruling defendant's objections, the 
court reminded the jury that "arguments of counsel are not to be considered" and that 
"arguments of counsel are not facts" (R. 161: 148-49). The court further reminded the jury 
that they had "listened to all the evidence and can weigh the evidence and if it's inconsistent 
with what argument of counsel is they are aware that they are the fact finders in this case" 
(R.161: 149). See Addendum B. Despite defendant's claim that the court's admonitions 
were inadequate, very similar instructions were deemed sufficient in Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^ 
6&24. 
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17-18-L7. Powers — Duties of district attorney — Prohi-
bitions. 
11) The district attorney is a public prosecutor and shall 
(a) prosecute in the name of the state all violations of criminal statutes 
of the state, 
(b) be a full-time county officer, 
ic) conduct on behalf of the state all prosecutions for public offenses 
committed within the county, except for prosecutions undertaken bv the 
city attorney under Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them and 
<d) institute proceedings before the proper magistrate for the arrest of 
persons charged with or reasonably suspected of any violation of state law 
when in possession of information that the offense has been committed 
and for that purpose shall attend court in person or by deputy in cases of 
arrests when required 
(2) The district attorney shall 
(a) appear and prosecute for the state in the district court all criminal 
actions for violation of state law, 
(b) render assistance as required by the attorney general in all criminal 
matters or matters enumerated m Subsections (5) and (8» that mav be 
appealed to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court and shall prosecute 
the appeal from any crime charged by the distnct attorney as a misde-
meanor m the district court. 
(3) The district attorney shall 
(a) attend the deliberations of the grand jury, 
<b) draw all indictments and informations for offenses against the laws 
of this state within the county, 
(c) cause all persons indicted or informed against to be speedily ar-
raigned, 
(d) cause all witnesses for the state to be subpoenaed to appear before 
the court or grand jury, 
<e) examine carefully into the sufficiency of all appearance bonds that 
may be tendered to the distnct court of the county, and 
(f) perform other duties as required by law 
(4) The distnct attorney shall 
(a) each year on the first business day of August file a report with the 
attorney general covenng the preceding fiscal year stating the number of 
cnminal prosecutions in his office, the character of the offenses charged 
the number of convictions, the amount of fines and penalties imposed and 
the amount collected, and 
(b) call attention to any defect in the operation of the laws and suggest 
amendments to correct the defect 
(5) The distnct attorney shall 
(a) appear and prosecute for the state in the juvenile court of the 
prosecution distnct in any proceeding involving delinquency, 
(b) represent the state in any proceeding pending before the ju\emle 
court if any nghts to the custody of any juvenile are asserted by am third 
person, and 
(c) prosecute before the court any person charged with abuse neglect 
or contnbuting to the delinquency or dependency of a juvenile 
<6) A district attorney may not 
fa) engage in private practice of law 
• b> engage in any occupation that may conflict with his duties a^  a 
distnct attorney, 
«o in any manner consult, advise counsel, or defend within this -tare 
any person charged with any crime, misdemeanor, or breach of anv pena. 
statute or ordinance, 
(d) be qualified to prosecute or dismiss in the name of the state anv ca^ 
in which the district attorney has previously acted as counsel for rhe 
accused on the pending charge, or 
<e) in any case compromise any cause or enter a nolle prosequi after the 
filing of an indictment or information without the consent of the court 
(7) If at any time after investigation by the distnctjudge involved, the judge 
finds and recommends that the distnct attorney in any prosecution distnct .* 
unable to satisfactonly and adequately perform the duties in prosecuting a 
cnminal case without additional legal assistance, the attorney general shaJ 
provide the additional assistance 
(8) The distnct attorney may act as counsel to any state or local gov ernment 
agency or entity regarding only the following matters of civil law 
(a) bail bond forfeiture actions: 
(b) actions for the forfeiture of property or contraband because JI 
misuse of the property or possession of the contraband in violation ot 
cnminal statutes of the state, 
(c) civil actions incidental to or appropnate to supplement the distnc* 
attornev's duties as state prosecuting attorney including injunction 
habeas corpus, declaratory actions, and extraordmarv writ actions m 
which the interests of the state in any criminal prosecution or investiga-
tion may be affected, and 
<d) any civil duties otherwise provided by statute 
<9> The distnct attorney or his deputy may be sworn as a deputv countv 
attorney for the purpose of public convenience for a penod ot time and subject 
to limitations specified by the county attorney 
08-tJ /-Z. ueui i i t iwu^. 
li As used m this chapter 
a) -Administer" means the direct application of a contmilec ^c-tar,-
*hether oy injection, inhalation, ingestion, or an> other means to :--
body of a patient or research subject by 
u) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent
 0 
'a) the patient or research subject at the direction ana in \ 
presence of the practitioner 'e 
b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at th 
direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or practitioner but does n * 
include a motor earner, public warehouseman, or employee of any of them 
(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, sole propn 
etorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or othe 
legal entity, and any union or groups of individuals associated in fac, 
although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities 
created or maintained for the purpose of engaging in conduct ^1CH 
constitutes the commission of episodes of activity made unlawful by Title 
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, which episodes are not isolated but 
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, method 
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing character 
istics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlavt*, 
conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise 
(d) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a ar^ 
substance, or immediate precursor under Section 58-37-3 
(e) (I) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance included
 n 
Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a 
drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, PL 91-513, or any 
controlled substance analog. 
di) "Controlled substance" does not include: 
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms 
are defined or used m Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food, 
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals, which contains ephednne, pseudoephednne, norpseudo 
ephednne, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully pur-
chased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription, or 
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other 
similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are 
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally 
occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this chap-
ter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(f) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means a substance the chemical 
structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of 
a controlled substance listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-374 
or in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title 
II, PL. 91-513: 
(A) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stimu-
lant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system of controlled substances in the schedules set forth in this 
subsection; or 
(B) which, with respect to a particular individual, is repre-
sented or intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or halluano 
gemc effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to 
the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system of controlled substances in the schedules set forth 
in this subsection. 
(ii) Controlled substance analog does not include: 
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled in Schedules I 
through V of Section 58-37-4; 
(B) a substance for which there is an approved new drug 
application; 
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is in effect 
for investigational use by a particular person under Section 505 of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 366, to the extent the 
conduct with respect to the substance is permitted by the exemp-
tion; or 
(D) any substance to the extent not intended for human 
consumption before an exemption takes effect with respect to the 
substance. 
(E) Any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure. 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals, which contains ephednne, pseudoephednne, norpseudo-
ephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully pur-
chased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription. 
(F) Dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other 
similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are 
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally 
occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this chap-
ter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(g) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by verdict, whether jury 
or bench, or plea, whether guilty or no contest, for any offense proscnbed 
by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or for any offense under the 
laws of the United States and any other state which, if committed in this 
state, would be an offense under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d. 
(h) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that 
without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of 
a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or 
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the 
substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance distrib-
uted by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance 
(i) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an 
agency relationship exists, 
(j) "Department" means the Department of Commerce, 
(k) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid; or 
(B) any derivative of barbituric acid which has been designated 
by the Secretary of Agriculture as habit-forming under Sectm 
502 (d) of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U S C 3^ 
(d); *' 
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of 
amphetamine; or 
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services or the Attorney General of the United States after 
investigation has found and by regulation designated habit. 
forming because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous 
system; or 
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of 
the United States after investigation has found to have, and bv 
regulation designated as having, a potential for abuse because of u§ 
depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or ts 
hallucinogenic effect. 
(1) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled substance by a phar-
macist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order or prescnption of 
a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or 
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or com-
pounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery. 
(m) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a controlled sub-
stance. 
(n) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dis-
pensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical. 
(0) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled substances 
(p) "Drug" means: 
(i) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia. 
Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or Official 
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; 
(ii) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation. 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
(iii) articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or 
function of man or other animals; and 
(iv) articles intended for use as a component of any articles speci-
fied in Subsection (i), (ii), or (iii); but does not include devices or their 
components, parts, or accessones. 
(q) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully and 
habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger the public morals 
health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of controlled 
substances as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his 
dependency. 
(r) aFood" means: 
(i) any nutnent or substance of plant, mineral or animal origin 
other than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested 
by human beings; and 
(ii) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical. 
physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not iim-
ited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, 
allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight, uses 
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age 
including but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and 
also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual 
diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property for use of a 
food Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use regardless of 
the nutritional purposes 
(s) "Immediate precursor " means a substance which the Attorney 
General of the United States has found to be, and by regulation designated 
as being, the pnncipal compound used or produced primarily for use in the 
manufacture of a controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical 
intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled 
substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the 
manufacture of the controlled substance 
(t) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, 
compounding, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or indepen-
dently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction 
and chemical synthesis 
(u) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or 
labels any container of any controlled substance, except pharmacists who 
dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate 
consumer. 
(v) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis and all parts of 
the genus, whether growing or not, the seeds of it, the resin extracted from 
any part of the plant, and every compound, manufacture, salt, denvative, 
mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin The term does not 
include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil 
or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufac-
ture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except 
the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the 
plant which is incapable of germination Any synthetic equivalents of the 
substances contained in the plant cannabis sativa or any other species of 
the genus cannabis which are chemically indistinguishable and pharma-
cologically active are also included 
(w) "Money* means officially issued coin and currency of the United 
States or any foreign country 
(x) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced 
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or 
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis 
(1) opium, coca leaves, and opiates, 
(n) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of 
opium, coca leaves, or opiates, 
(in) opium poppy and poppy straw, or 
(iv) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
or preparation of the substance, which is chemically identical with 
any of the substances referred to in Subsection (1), Ui), or (in), except 
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of 
coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine 
(y) Negotiable instrument" means documents containing an uncond 
tional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable * 
another party by endorsement or delivery 
(z) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction 
forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being 
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction 
sustaining liability 
(aa) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species papaver sommferum 
L , except the seeds of the plant 
(bb) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust 
other institution or entity or one or more individuals 
(cc) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium 
poppy, after mowing 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distin 
guished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes indi 
vidual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances For a 
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required 
that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the 
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it. 
(ee) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharma-
cist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed 
registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct re-
search with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis 
a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in 
this state 
(ff) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or in writing 
(gg) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed practitioner in 
the course of that practitioner's professional practice, for a controlled 
substance, other drug, or device which it dispenses or administers for use 
by a patient or an animal The order may be issued by word of mouth 
written document, telephone, facsimile transmission, computer, or other 
electronic means of communication as defined by rule 
(hh) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, grow-
ing, or harvesting of a controlled substance 
(11) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
debt or of property 
(jj) "State" means the state of Utah 
(kk) "Ultimate user" means amy person who lawfully possesses a 
controlled substance for his own use, for the use of a member of his 
household, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member 
of his household 
(2) If a term used in this chapter is not defined, the definition and terms of 
Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, shall apply 
1 Prohibited acts A — Penalties 
a) Except as authorized by this chapter it is unlawful for an\ pe^on 'o 
knowinglv and intentionally 
(i) produce, manufacture or dispense or to possess with intent :o 
produce, manufacture, or dispense a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance 
ui) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance or to agree 
consent, offer, or arrange to distnbute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, (in) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distnbute, or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony, and 
iB) the violation is a part of a continuing senes of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management 
ib) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IK a) with respect to 
<i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony, 
(a) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony, or 
du) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(lXaXu) or (ui) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, earned, or possessed on his person or m his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently, and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXaXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
d) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authonzed by this chapter 
(n) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations, or 
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
lu) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony or 
(in) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
rpsm from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confirm nw nt 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than prov.acvj in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a ,i.e 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all otrv r 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)ib)(i), in), cr n . 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a ciais A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)<ax in) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor: and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked. 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a pubhc or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
liv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
v in a public park amusement park arcade or recreation center 
vn in a church or synagogue, 
vn> in a chopping mall, sports facility stadium arena theater 
movie house playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto 
(via) in a public parking lot or structure, 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)U) through (vim, or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 vears of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than fi\ e years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(o If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4) 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescnbed for that offense 
id) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age, nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as descnbed in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as descnbed in Subsection (4)(a) 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor 
(6) la) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section ism addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is pnma facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances 
(8; This section does not prohibit a vetennanan, m good faith and m the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescnbing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision 
(9) Civil or cnmmal liability may not be imposed under this section on 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distnbutes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research, or 
lb) any law enforcement officer acting m the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application 
State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah App. 1991) (when evidence is not "clear or 
conclusive," the court "must allow for the prosecution's reasonable inferences and 
deductions"). Acevedo, as a defense witness, testified that defendant "had his car" in the 
bar's parking lot (R.161: 110). When asked the type of car defendant had, Avecedo said he 
could not remember (id.). In contrast, defendant's mother testified that two days prior to 
defendant's arrest, he sold "a car" to his uncle (R.161: 114). Presumptively, the car was 
defendant's since, according to the mother, he kept the money (R. 161: 113-14). The mother 
initially claimed it was a 1989 vehicle but corrected herself and said she had "forgotten" the 
year (R.161: 114). When asked the brand, she said she did not know the brands of cars but 
then volunteered that it was a "Honda" (id.). Assuming Acevedo was telling the truth and 
defendant had his car at the bar on August 13th, then either defendant owned two cars 
(something no witness claimed) or his mother was lying or mistaken about the date of the 
car's sale (assuming arguendo there was a sale). While the evidence did not conclusively 
establish that Acevedo and defendant's mother were referring to the same car, the prosecutor 
permissibly argued that they were. The court, therefore, properly overruled defendant's 
objection to the prosecutor's evidentiary deduction. 
The prosecutor's second statement - that if a sale had really occurred, the defense 
would have produced documentation - is also fair comment on the evidence. Defense 
counsel had just argued that the mother was credible and her testimony "evidence" of 
defendant's innocence (R.161: 145). The prosecutor was entitled to attack that credibility, 
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especially in light of the mother's natural bias for her son, by stating the obvious: if 
defendant really sold his car, why not produce neutral documentary evidence to corroborate 
the mother's testimony? (R.161: 148). See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^  57 (permissible for 
prosecutor to attack or support credibility of a witness by suggesting reasonable inferences 
to jury). See also United States v. Cabrera, 201 F.3d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A 
prosecutor may express doubt about the veracity of a witness's testimony."). Furthermore, 
commenting on defendant's failure to provide documentation did not impermissibly shift the 
burden of proof as claimed by defendant, Br.Aplu at 39-42. See Cabrera, 201 F.3d at 1250 
("A prosecutor's comment on a defendant's failure to call a witness does not shift the burden 
of proof, and is therefore permissible, so long as the prosecutor does not violate the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on the defendant's failure to testify."). 
The jury had already been fully informed of the State's burden to prove the elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 108-10). At the same time, they were instructed that, 
as the fact-finder, they must weigh and determine the credibility of witnesses (R. 121-22). 
Taken in context, the jury would not have understood the prosecutor's comment to mean 
defendant had a burden of proof, but that the prosecutor disputed the legitimacy of the 
defense. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,1 60; Cabrera, 201 F.3d at 1250. 
The prosecutor's final objected-to statement - that Acevedo admitted he would "lie 
for his friends"(R.161: 148) - is not supported by the evidence. In cross-examining 
Acevedo, the prosecutor asked a series of questions about truth and lies, after which Acevedo 
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admitted that because he was already convicted and facing deportation, he had nothing to 
lose by what he said at defendant's trial (R.160: 111). A fair inference from this admission 
is that Acevedo might lie for defendant. Acevedo was not asked, however, and did not 
actually say that he "would lie for his friends," as stated by the prosecutor in argument 
(R.161: 148). The remark is, therefore, an inaccurate representation of the evidence. 
Nevertheless, an unintentional misstatement does not alone establish prosecutorial 
misconduct. See Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^ 22; Modica, 663 F.2d at 1181. The prosecutor's 
misstatement does not appear to be a deliberate misrepresentation, but simply inaccurate 
recall. See Span, 819 P.2d at 330 (characterizing misconduct as intentional where prosecutor 
"deliberately" introduced evidence previously excluded by court); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483, 485 (Utah 1984) (characterizing misconduct as intentional where prosecutor made 
statements which he knew were not true). 
In any case, the misstatement is not "substantial," but a "minor aberration" in a trial 
that was otherwise void of "passion and prejudice." See Modica, 663 F.2d at 1181. Absent 
the misstatement, the jury had ample reasons to question Acevedo's veracity: he was an 
admitted drug-user found in illegal possession of drugs while illegally in this country. See 
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 853-854 (Utah App. 1992) (finding no error where 
"prosecution's reference to defendant as a liar, while intemperate, only disclosed what the 
jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence"), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993). In light of the trial court's formal instruction and oral admonitions that the comments 
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of counsel were not evidence, see note 16, supra, there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
prosecutor's misstatement prejudicially affected the outcome of the trial. See Kohl, 2000 UT 
35, Ifll 22 & 24. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction for distribution of a cocaine. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ogTWn day of November, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
10-3-701. Legislative power exercised by ordinance. 
Except as otherwise specifically provided, the governing oodv of ta<.n 
municipality shall exercise its legislative powers through ordinances 
10-3-716. Fines and forfeitures — Disposition. 
All fines, penalties, and forfeitures for the violation of any ordinance, when 
collected, shall be paid into the municipal treasury within seven days after the 
collection date A violation of this section constitutes a class C misdemeanor 
The retention or use of any fine, penalty or forfeiture by any person for 
personal use or benefit constitutes a class B misdemeanor, except that if the 
amount or amounts exceed $1,000 the offense is a class A misdemeanor as 
defined in the Utah Criminal Code. 
10-3-928. Attorney duties — Deputy public prosecutor. 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney may prosecute violations of 
city ordinances, and under state law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring 
within the boundaries of the municipality and has the same powers in respect 
to violations as are exercised by a county attorney or district attorney except 
that a city attorney's authonty to grant immunity shall be limited to granting 
transactional immunity for violations of city ordinances, and under state law 
infractions, and misdemeanors occurring within the boundaries of the munici. 
pahty The city attorney shall represent the interests of the state or the 
municipality in the appeal of any matter prosecuted in any tnal court by the 
city attorney. 
10-8-84. Ordinances, rules, and regulations — Passage — 
Penalties. 
(1) The municipal legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or 
discharging all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and as are 
necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and 
promote the prospenty, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and 
convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of property 
in the city. 
(2) The municipal legislative body may enforce obedience to the ordinances 
with fines or penalties m accordance with Section 10-3-703 
.1) For purposes of this part a person is guiltv of an attempt to commr a 
crime if acting with the kind of culpability other* i*e required for • e 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a
 5ub*tant ai 
step toward commission of the offense 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor s intent to commit the offence 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall anse 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed, or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be 
76-4-203. Criminal solicitation — Elements. 
(1) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felonv be 
committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes 
another person to engage in specific conduct that under the circumstance- as 
the actor beheves them to be would be a felony or would cause the other person 
to be a party to the commission of a felony 
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section only if the solicitation is 
made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor s intent that the 
offense be committed 
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person solicited bv the 
actor 
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation, 
(b) does not commit an overt act. 
<o does not engage in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
the commission of any offense, 
<d) is not criminally responsible for the felony solicited, 
(e) was acquitted, was not prosecuted or convicted or was convicted of 
a different offense or of a different type or degree of offense, or 
< f) is immune from prosecution 
(4) It is not a defense under this section that the actor 
(a) belongs to a class of persons that by definition is legally incapable of 
committing the offense in an individual capacity, or 
(b) fails to communicate with the person he solicits to commit an 
offense, if the intent of the actor's conduct was to effect the communica-
tion 
15) Nothing m this section prevents an actor who otherwise solicits re-
quests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense from being prosecuted and convicted as 
a party to the offense under Section 76-2-202 if the person solicited actually 
commits the offense 
76-4-204. Criminal solicitation — Penalties. 
Cnminal solicitation to commit 
( D a capital felony is a first degree felony, 
<2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony, 
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony, and 
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor 
77-1-5. Prosecuting party. 
A cnminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be prosecuted 
the name of the state of Utah A cnminal action for violation of anv counn i 
municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of the go\ernmenm 
entity involved 
2 08 040 Office Of Cit\ \ t torne\: 
A Functions: 
1 The city attorney shall be the chief legal officer of the city and shall be responsible to the 
mayor and city council for the proper administration of the legal atfairs ot the executive and 
legislative branches of city government 
2 The executive and legislative branches of government shall enjoy equal and independent acce^ 
to the services of the office of the city attorney with reference to their respective functions and 
duties It shall be the responsibility of the city attorney to administer the office of the cm attornev 
in a manner which will enable the mavor and city council to fulfill their respective duties in a 
timely fashion 
3 The foregoing notwithstanding, the city attorney shall not in any instance, either personalh or 
by his or her deputies, act as both prosecutor and advocate before (and at the same time adv ii>or 
to) any board, commission, agency, officer, official or body of the city In cases where such a 
conflict shall arise, special counsel may be employed who shall not be subject to the control or 
direction of the city attorney in such matter, and who shall provide the legal service to or before 
such board, commission, agency, officer, official or body 
B Separate Executive Or Legislative Counsel: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
prohibit either the city council or mayor from retaining separate counsel from appropriated tund^ a^  
either may from time to time deem appropriate (Ord 8-86 § 1, 1986 prior code § 24-3-4) 
11.12.100 Solicitation of person(s) with intent to have another commit an offense specified in 
Section 58-37-8, Ltah Code Annotated. 
A 1 It is unlawful for any person to request, or solicit a controlled substance, or controlled 
substance precursor from another person, except as permitted by the Utah Controlled Substances Act 
Section 63-37-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, or its successor 
2 Definitions 
a "Controlled substance" means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor as defined by 
Section 58-37-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, or its successor 
b "Controlled substance precursor" means any matenal defined as a controlled substance 
precursor by Section 58-37c-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, or its successor 
B Violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor (Ord 57-95 § 1. 1995) 
Addendum B 
MR. SHEFFIELD: Does this double as an easel? 
THE COURT: Theoretically that part is, yes. 
Okay. I think I'm ready. Let's get the jury. 
(Whereupon, the jury returned to the courtroom at 
9:55 a.m.) 
THE COURT: Good morning and welcome back. What 
I'm having Aaron do now is pass out copies of the jury 
instructions which I'll read to you. You're free to follow 
along with them. They tend to be a little bit lengthy. You'll 
also be sent the originals with you into the jury room at the 
time of your deliberations. 
(Whereupon, the court so instructed the jury.) 
THE COURT: That is the extent of the 
instructions that you will consider at the time of your 
deliberations. Closing, Mr. Sheffield? 
MR. SHEFFIELD: Well, we're here. Thank you. 
I've been watching and I know, I had my officer watching 
yesterday, you're all very attentive and listening to the 
testimony. Sometimes it's a little more difficult when the 
only evidence or most of the evidence is just coming from the 
witness stand. There's no other hard pieces of evidence. The 
only one that we have is that officer report and that will go 
back with you to the jury room. 
I'd like to just quickly review the way the state 
sees this case and I'm sure you haven't forgotten much 
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overnight. But lest we forget the purpose of Detective Purvis 
being at that bar was not for drug interdiction. The purpose 
was for under age drinking. And as he entered the bar you'll 
remember a security guard came and said he suspected 
something was going on in the bathroom, and that's not 
uncommon where that kind of activity takes place because it's 
a little more private than out on the dance floor or in the 
bar. 
So Detective Purvis went to the bathroom and the 
first thing he saw when he opened the door and went in was 
that defendant standing there. And you'll remember the 
description of the clothes he was wearing that were unique to 
him. Most everybody else in the bar the testimony — his 
testimony reflected were dressed cowboy boots, jeans perhaps, 
cowboy hats. It was a Mexican bar with salsa music going. And 
he did not look like the rest of the ones in there. The rest 
of the patrons that were there. 
And so his attention was drawn to him. And what 
happened when he went in? They scattered, they all left 
including the defendant. Purvis then left himself and walked 
across the edges of the dance floor to the bar area to resume 
why he was there, looking for under age drinking. 
And his testimony was about 10 minutes he was 
doing that, then he noticed again the defendant walked back 
into the bathroom with some others. And he told you he had a 
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gut feeling what was going on in there. There was illegal 
activity, likely drugs, but he elected not to go back in that 
second time because the same thing probably would have 
happened. 
And about that point in time his sergeant said 
let's go to another bar, but on the way out they saw a couple 
under age drinkers. They left the bar with those under age 
drinkers. Went to the car. You'll remember the diagram. 
(Inaudible) the officers entered the parking lot where there 
cars were. And the sergeant said well why don't you just go 
look through the parking lot. And why did he do that? Again 
for the same purpose that they were there, either looking for 
under age drinkers or people that would come out and take a 
drink of their own liquor because they didn't want to pay the 
bar. 
So that's what they were doing. That's what Purvis 
was doing. That's what Woodbury was doing. That's what Martin 
was doing. 
And so the third time he sees this defendant who 
is uniquely dressed, he is now leaving, and I think that's 
important. They're not side by side just walking casually 
out. He's leading him, this other person who you heard 
testify, Ignacio, and where do they go? He's deciding where 
they go. 
They walk and Purvis is walking almost parallel, 
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1 two car widths apart. Then they cut in between two cars and 
2 they go hide behind a panel delivery type van where no 
3 windows are. Where there's a little bit of secrecy and 
4 privacy. 
5 There's a reason for that. They hadn't seen 
6 anybody. I'm sure they were looking in the parking lot just 
7 like Detectives were looking in the parking lot. Didn't see 
8 anybody. He's the one who decided where they went to stand to 
9 do their little deal. Their transfer. Their exchange. 
10 Whatever you want to call it. Their hand-to-hand exchange. 
11 So that's the third time that Detective Purvis had 
12 seen this individual. And you'll remember he was circling 
13 back and was going to follow them but they stopped. He 
14 stopped. And he turned around and faced Ignacio. And he 
15 determined where and when to do the deal. Purvis standing 
16 just the other side of the car from where they had stopped. 
17 And, again, he thought he'd walked out and 
18 (inaudible) it all apart. But he froze. He just stood there. 
19 Eight to 10 feetf testified there was light coming from 
2 0 behind him, going that direction over his shoulders into the 
21 two that were there. 
22 And what did he see? He sees this defendant and 
23 Ignacio kind of hunkered over a little bit with all four 
24 hands right out there. They're not looking around. They're 
25 looking at their hands. And why are they looking at their 
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hands? Because they're going to do something. 
It's also his testimonyf his training and 
experience, that people that get into that kind of position 
each have a reason for being there. And by now you know one 
was there to sell. The other was there to buy. And when you 
get into that kind of a situation not only is it quick 
because you don't want to be belaboring the issue, but it's 
fluid. They've done it before. They know how to do it. And if 
you aren't watching you won't see it. 
And that's when he saw the money come out from the 
left hand, his left hand with his right hand still down 
there. Then he's made. They both see him because he does one 
of these to his other officers. 
And they both turn and as this defendant pulls his 
right hand away that's when he sees the white package of the 
drug. And as he pulls away the other one, Ignacio, closes his 
right hand and goes right to his pocket with it. 
A lot can be made of what Purvis did at that 
point. He told you that his focus was right on Ignacio 
because it's not unusual for somebody who has just purchased 
drugs to ditch them one way or the other. So he needed to 
watch Ignacio. That's why he had motioned his other officers 
to take care of this defendant. 
The search took place of the defendant. There was 
$1,426. Much has been made of the fact that we don't know the 
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denominations of what was in the hands, of what was in the 
pocket, of what was in the wallet. You've heard a defense 
spin on why he had that money. 
Ladies and gentlemen, one of the jury instructions 
that you have talks about using your common sense. We're not 
to check our common sense at the door. We have life's 
experiences. We can draw reasonable conclusions. 
Now, his mother came in and testified, and I think 
it was an uncle, somebody bought a car, his car, and gave him 
$2,000 for his car. 
Maybe. Maybe not. I would wonder why somebody 
would have brought all that money with him to a bar where 
he's going to be ostensibly drinking, dancing. Again it's 
just a common sense thing that we can draw our own 
conclusions about whether that actually happened. Personally, 
I don't believe it. But you're the ones that have to make 
that determination whether that's plausible enough for you. 
We do know he had a substantial wad of money 
folded in half in his right front pants pocket, and we do 
know that there was a substantial amount in his wallet, and 
we do know that there was some in his hand at the time of his 
arrest consistent with the hand-to-hand drug buy and 
distribution. 
I'd like to put up for your review, this is the 
evidence instruction and it says before you convict the 
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1 defendant, Sergio Renaga Gutierrez, of the offense of 
2 unlawful distribution (Inaudible), substance as charged in 
3 the information, you must find from all the evidence and 
4 beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
5 elements of that offense. 
6 Number one. That on or about the 13th day of 
7 August, 2000, absolutely no doubt about number one. 
8 Number two. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
9 There's no doubt about that. 
10 The defendant, Sergio Renaga-Gutierrez. There's no 
11 doubt that he is the one. 
12 Number four. Distributed (inaudible) agreed, 
13 consented or arranged to distribute. No doubt in my mind, and 
14 we'll talk about that. 
15 Number five. Cocaine. Absolutely no doubt. The tox 
16 report tells you that. That cocaine was then and there a 
17 controlled substance. No doubt. You have a jury instruction 
18 to that fact. 
19 And number seven. The defendant did so 
2 0 intentionally and knowingly. There's no doubt about that. But 
21 we'll talk about that. 
22 Let's look at these definitions. Arranging 
23 (inaudible) or intentional (inaudible) in any form or any act 
24 in furtherance of (A) for distribution of a controlled 
25 substance. 
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You can reasonably make the argument that he was 
leading him out to the parking lot. He was the one that was 
in the lead, directing where they go. Where to stop. When 
they make the deal. 
Distributing is deliver (inaudible) by 
administering or dispensing a controlled substance. Deliver, 
the actual constructive or attempted transfer of a controlled 
substance whether or not (inaudible). Exactly what occurred. 
(Inaudible). There's no doubt he arranged. There's no doubt 
he delivered. 
And you are instructed that a person engages in 
conduct (inaudible) or with intent or willfully with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or as a result of his conduct 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. Is there really any doubt in 
your mind? 
Common sense. If are buying a controlled substance 
you want to minimize your exposure. You wouldn't want to be 
going and buying and buying and buying. You'd go and buy what 
you're going to need and leave. 
Look at his suspicious activity. How many times 
did he go in the restroom that we know of? And then he leaves 
the restrooms and he thinks the cops are probably still in 
there and he goes out into the parking lot to continue his 
activity. 
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Knowingly or with knowledge with respect to his 
conduct or the circumstances surrounding his conduct when 
he's aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstance. A person has knowingly (inaudible) knowledge 
with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause this result. 
Now as you look at those elements there's no doubt 
on any of them. And I would ask you to convict this defendant 
as charged. 
Because it is my burden I will have one more 
opportunity to talk with you and I will take advantage of 
that. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sheffield. Mr. 
Dellapiana. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Thank you, Your Honor. Ladies 
and gentlemen, the State's entire case is based on mistaken 
assumptions. What the officer saw was two friends, 
acquaintances, leaving the bar after the bar was closing, 
dancing was over, going to the parking lot, talking a little 
bit about the dance, shaking hands and saying good-bye. 
Let's look at what the officer assumed he had 
seen. (Inaudible) from when he first saw these two 
individuals, Sergio and the other fellow. Remember he said he 
saw them come out of the side door. That was his estimate. On 
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cross examination I said, well, wait a minute. Where did you 
first see them? Oh, right here. Which by the way, certainly 
he sees them walk maybe one car length. I'm not sure how you 
could — how you should interpret this idea they were going 
off on some (inaudible). 
But anyway he admitted, oh, yes, I guess they 
could have come out the front door. I just assumed they came 
out the side door because that's where I saw them. 
What he saw he described, he himself described as 
a handshake. And immediately he leapt to the conclusion, oh, 
I'm suspicious that that's a drug deal. So, the drug deal 
(inaudible) before he actually sees anything. 
And as you'll recall on cross examination even he 
had to admit that up to that time he had not seen anything 
illegal. He gave that to me. (Inaudible) The prosecutors. 
Even as they were outside he said as you saw them outside 
(inaudible). He said no. 
He's quickly jumping to some conclusion. He goes 
up. He stops them. Pats down Ignacio, finds a twist of 
cocaine on him. Assumes without knowing that he got it from 
Sergio. 
But why do I say he assumes without knowing? Even 
by his own testimony, the officer's own testimony, he sees 
Sergio with money and Ignacio with some sort of white 
substance. He never saw a transfer between the two of them. 
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Never saw Sergio give money to Ignacio or vice versa. He's 
assuming that that's what happened. 
And there's some other troubling things, very 
troubling things about the officers testimony in that regard 
about what he saw particularly after he heard my opening 
statement where I said he wasn't (inaudible). He saw Ignacio 
give the money to Sergio. Saw Sergio with money. And I said, 
no, he won't be able to say that. But he did, didn't he? You 
can go by your own recollection, but he tried very hard to 
say well, actually I did see that money in Ignacio's hand. 
And I had to— and I challenged him on that, had 
to cross examine him (inaudible). You previously testified 
under oath to the contrary at the preliminary hearing. 
We read into the record his responses from the 
preliminary hearing where he testified under oath. 
(Inaudible) say, you didn't see Mr. Acevedo, Ignacio, with 
the money? His answer? " That's correct." 
And just to confirm I asked him again see if you 
can answer the question." You didn't see Mr. Acevedo with the 
money in his hands?" Answer " no". 
But now he wants so badly to try to make this case 
stick the way he originally assumed that it happened that 
he's willing to change his testimony. 
Another troubling thing shows how much the state 
and/or the officers want to make this case stick. You're 
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going to get an exhibit, the toxicology report. The 
toxicology report shows that there's really a bindle of 
cocaine. There isn't any dispute that one of these bindles of 
cocaine were found on the person of Ignacio Perex Acevedo. 
One by the officer in the parking lot and two during a more 
thorough search at the jail later. 
(Inaudible) Ignacio Perex Acevedo or Sergio 
Renaga-Gutierrez. You're going to see that (inaudible) but 
please realize that that (inaudible) that this officer's own 
testimony was such that he indicated those were all found on 
Ignacio. 
The other officer's testimony was also kind of 
bothersome. You know, I was trying to make an issue of the 
denominations. If you're investigating an alleged 
transaction aren't you supposed to take note of who has what 
money and where? The thing that bothers me most about it is 
not that (inaudible) number (inaudible) specifically denied 
that he had a duty that was — in the sense that he reported 
in the Salt Lake City Police reporting process, or part of 
their general form, the police form to fill in the 
denominations• 
I asked him about it. I warned him that I already 
have the police documents. After he agreed that, yeah, I 
didn't write one so I went ahead and read the other officer's 
report. 
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And after he said it was his — his responsibility 
to fill that in, then denied there was a form. I showed it 
to him. (Inaudible) this is evidence but you'll recall after 
I showed it to him saying — I said, well, where is it that 
you see this? Oh, well, it's the part where you enter the 
denominations. What are the denominations? Oh hundreds, 
fifties, twenties, tens, et cetera. 
It was — it was because he was so misleading that 
I — that I have serious questions about the frankness and 
credibility of any of his testimony and so should you. 
All of these things raise significant doubts about 
the state's case, reasonable doubts. 
One other thing about the state's case and I 
wasn't going to talk about this because I thought it was so 
— so minor but how weak is the state's case if they have to 
try to persuade you that the fact that one person is wearing 
clothing different than another person has some sort of 
importance in the case. Officer's testimony, yeah, he was 
wearing a shirt, Panama hat. Most of the other guys were 
wearing button down shirts with cowboy hats. Not every single 
person differently, of course. I mean, I hesitate to even 
talk about this it's so minor but that's the sort of thing 
the state is trying to get you to rely on. 
How about the issue about the bathroom. I wasn't 
going to talk about this either but the officer walks into 
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1 the bathroom. Wasn't going to use the bathroom. I guess 
2 he's standing there looking at these guys, you know. I mean, 
3 it's not surprising that anybody in there would say, hum, 
4 let's get out of here. And then the officer said he didn't 
5 see anything unusual or didn't see anything illegal. 
6 Let me talk a little bit about the defenses case. 
7 We presented evidence that proves that Sergio Gutierrez is 
8 innocent of this charge. We don't have to present evidence. 
9 We don't have the burden to prove anything to you. The state 
10 has the entire burden to what? To present its evidence from 
11 people who know, not assuming, people who know what happened. 
12 Ignacio Acevedo frankly admitted that he was 
13 carrying the cocaine. Pled guilty to having the cocaine, not 
14 just the one in his pocket but the other two they found 
15 later. He's in jail for it now, has nothing to gain at this 
16 time. He's doing some time. He's going to be deported. He has 
17 no interest in the outcome of this case. Knew the definition 
18 of perjury. Testified according to his knowledge. Told you 
19 where he got the drugs from. Specifically not from Sergio 
2 0 Gutierrez. Confirmed there was no distribution or offering or 
21 agreeing or consenting or arranging between them. 
22 We have the testimony of Maria Renaga about the 
23 source of the money in case the money was significant to you. 
24 More importantly than the state's or at least as 
25 important as the defendant's own witnesses is I think the 
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physical evidence corroborates the defense's explanation of 
the events more than it does the state's. Where are the 
drugs? Officer sees the drugs in Ignacio's hands, Ignacio 
Acevedo's hands, not Sergio. 
And the number of packages also is a clue. The 
officer — this is, I think, critical. The officer sees two 
people. And they're making an issue, number one, maybe this 
was a drug transaction. I mean there's suspicious 
circumstances about that. But if there was who was the 
seller? Person without the drugs or person with the drugs 
not. Not only did Ignacio Acevedo have the money the officer 
found in his pocket, this is an officer who's trained to 
conduct searches. He testifies he sees one twist, pats him 
down, feels one twist. Puts his hands in his pocket, pulls it 
out, finds one twist. Two were found at the jail but of 
course you have to (inaudible.) Twists of cocaine. 
If there is a buying and selling going on it ought 
to raise serious concern for you about who was doing it. 
Certainly it supports that it wasn't Sergio Gutierrez that 
was selling drugs, if anyone. 
The elements of the case. The date is not in 
question. Salt Lake County (inaudible.) What's in question is 
who was it that was doing the selling. Was it nobody? Was it 
Ignacio Acevedo? 
There's two things I want to say about this. One 
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is that the officer did not see the transfer. He tried to say-
that he did but on cross-examination he had to admit the 
first time he approaches these guys they're shaking hands. 
He's waving. They look at him. They're separating. 
The first time he sees any white substance in the 
hands of Ignacio Acevedo and when he tried to say that he got 
it from Sergio he had to admit, well, it was — he was 
blocked (Inaudible). Eventually I got him to admit maybe, no, 
he didn't see a transfer of an illegal substance. He didn't 
see a distribution. I mean, that's — that's not proof. 
That's — that maybe he's got some suspicions. Maybe he can 
make some assumptions but that's not proof of a distribution 
when he himself says he didn't see one. 
Same with the money. He tried to say, oh, yeah, I 
saw the money in Ignacio's hands first but he's testified 
under oath (Inaudible). Because he didn't see a distribution 
and didn't hear anything about offering or arranging the 
state has no proof of the distribution charge — element. 
Even by their own — never mind these defense witnesses. The 
state's own witnesses have not shown there was a 
distribution. 
Okay. Now here's the other thing I want to say 
about that. As the judge indicated to you I'm — as is the 
prosecutor, I'm an advocate. I'm a partisan. I'm arguing 
one side of the case which is what I'm supposed to do anyway. 
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But I'm going to try to put this evidence the state has 
presented in a light most favorable to their case and for the 
purpose of this little bit of argument I want you to 
disregard the sworn testimony of the defenses own witnesses 
who knew where the money came from, who knew where the drugs 
came from* Testified clearly in support of finding Sergio 
Gutierrez not guilty. We'll just forget about them for a 
minute. Just look at the state's evidence. 
As the prosecutor argued, okay, two people are 
there. They both have a reason for being there, one to buy, 
one to sell. And this goes back to what I started to say 
before about, well, who's buying, who's selling? Would it be 
the person with the drugs who's doing the selling? Person 
with the money who's doing the buying? That's a reasonable 
assumption. Particularly when you consider — and this kind 
of goes back to the bathroom thing. 
Why did he go to the bathroom a couple of times or 
why did he, you know, go out in the parking lot assuming for 
the moment that Sergio Gutierrez was the one doing the 
buying. Well, obviously the first — if we're going on this 
line of argument obviously the first time he went to the 
bathroom he was interrupted when he was trying to buy drugs. 
The officer came in, everybody left. He didn't 
have any drugs on him. It's not like he went and bought some, 
went and bought some, went and bought some as the state is 
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trying to argue. He didn't have any. And then he was 
interrupted by Officer Purvis again. Still didn't get any. 
If it was within my power to do so I would present 
you with the alternative of finding Sergio Gutierrez guilty 
of soliciting to buy drugs. Have to acknowledge I'm trying to 
be fair, that there's at least an inference that can be made 
from the state's witness — own witnesses that that's what 
was going on. 
In fact the evidence is stronger based on the 
state's case that that's what was going on than the officer 
because as we indicated before it's undisputed that Ignacio 
Acevedo was the one who had the drugs. And not only did he 
have drugs that he was apparently trying to sell at that 
particular moment, he had some others hidden for later 
selling. If he had just got them from — these other two 
twists from Sergio Gutierrez this highly trained officer 
would have found them hidden for later's sake. 
That's the state's best case. Course we have 
additional evidence that disputes even that — that even that 
happened. 
The last thing I want to talk to you about is the 
burden of proof and the standard of proof. The judge has made 
it clear the defense doesn't have any burden, that it's all 
on the state, and she's talking about the standard of proof, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I want to put that in 
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perspective. 
Everybody will agree that beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is the highest, most difficult standard. 
There's also a preponderance of the evidence standard that's 
applied to civil cases. Clear and convincing that's applied 
in some other cases. And a couple of you were involved in 
civil cases. I think one as a witness, one as a juror, and 
of course our military juror has a lot of judicial 
experience. 
In regards to the preponderance, those civil cases 
that's a case where somebody is suing a corporation for toxic 
tort. Polluting the water. In such a case the person, the 
plaintiff, bringing that case has to prove beyond a 
preponderance. It's not about trying to decide who has the 
most. Fifty percent, you have to have more than fifty percent 
to prove a preponderance. Otherwise (inaudible) evidence, 
forty-five percent of the evidence the defendant wins. 
(Inaudible) of proof is on the plaintiff. (Inaudible) Based 
on contracts, the question of implied contract you have 
preponderance of the evidence to decide whether implied 
contract is in force. 
(Inaudible) You think that that would be a high 
standard because of the importance of family. It is pretty 
high. (Inaudible) beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The same is true by a preponderance of the 
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evidence (inaudible.) The highest standard, beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard required in criminal cases to be 
sure (inaudible) humanly possible that we don't convict an 
innocent person. That's describing things somewhere up around 
ninety-nine percent. No specific percentage. 
Down here on the other end of this scale and up 
here, of course, is where the — we find somebody guilty. The 
rest of it (inaudible) you have to find a person not guilty. 
(Inaudible) down here (inaudible) of innocence (inaudible). 
Somewhere along here is lack of evidence of guilt. 
There is something down here called reasonable 
suspicion. (Inaudible) A person may have a suspicion and even 
if it's reasonable that they would have a — be suspicious 
under those circumstances that's (Inaudible) you can't find 
somebody guilty when he's under suspicion. (Inaudible) You 
see something suspicious you jump to a conclusion. 
(Inaudible) That's not— that's not proof. 
In this case we have — can reasonably imply the 
sorts of things we have in this case, we have evidence of 
innocence. Ignacio Acevedo, Maria Renaga who know what was 
going on, know what was happening, testified clearly as to 
Sergio Gutierrez' innocence. 
We have a lack of evidence of guilt. This is the 
officer didn't see the transaction. There was suspicious 
circumstances. He didn't see any transaction. He can't say 
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it was a distribution. Came up, interrupted them. Oh, okay, 
that's way down there on the not guilty side of your chart. 
Course I've already talked about his suspicions 
and his assumptions. And then — and then if there's an 
inference it can go one of two ways. 
A couple more things about preponderance. If you 
really can't find beyond a reasonable doubt, I mean you 
really can't determine the facts beyond a reasonable doubt, 
evidence goes both ways, somewhere around the preponderance 
standard, then it's safe to determine the state hasn't met 
its burden, you should find the defendant not guilty. 
Or if there's an alternative reasonable 
explanation for the facts as the evidence is presented, 
that's going to put you above the preponderance. In that 
regard I'm talking about what it looks like was actually 
going on, you know, giving the state all the reasonable 
doubt, disregarding the defense witnesses. I hope you don't, 
but if you did it looks like the evidence at least supports 
as we can make an inference, the evidence supports Sergio 
Gutierrez was going around with his money trying to find 
somebody to sell the drugs. 
So they say to buy drugs. In fact that's even more 
likely what happened than the state's explanation. More 
likely it could have gone this way on the chart. 
So, I certainly hope just to tie up, I certainly 
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hope that each of you believes the defense, Mr. Gutierrez, is 
innocent of this charge. But that's not the question you're 
being asked to decide. You're only being asked to decide 
whether the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt — any 
— any reasonable doubt that he's guilty. So the verdict of 
not guilty — it's not saying — it's not giving Sergio a 
certificate of innocence. It's simply saying that on these 
facts you cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt the state's 
met its burden. 
I believe on the facts that you've been presented 
not only that you ought to acquit him, find him not guilty, 
but that it's your duty, your sworn duty based on your oath 
that you find him not guilty. I ask you to do so. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Dellapiana. Rebuttal? 
MR. SHEFFIELD: I feel like I have a (inaudible) 
for putting the case in a light most favorable to the state 
but I think I'll pass on that. 
He said it was closing time and everybody was 
leaving. No. That's not what I heard. What I heard is that 
they were seeing the two of them, not a crowd of people 
leaving, the two of them were leaving and going. 
And what was the Ignacio's explanation? They were 
going to his car. The car they brought his mother in to tell 
you he had sold. Now he sold that — 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, I'm going to object to 
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the statement that his mother said that he sold that car. 
THE COURT: The jury's been instructed that 
arguments of counsel are not to be considered. They've 
listened to that. I'm not going to address that. They've bee 
properly instructed as to their job. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Very well. Thank you. 
MR. SHEFFIELD: You're right and he is right. 
Evidence of innocence. Don't believe for second that 
evidence of innocence. If they really wanted you to believe 
that he had sold the car and he had that money from the sale 
of the car, don't you think they would have brought in the 
bill of sale? Don't you think they'd have brought in a 
transfer of title? Don't you think — 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, I'm going to object. 
He's trying to switch the burden to the defense. I don't 
have the burden of proof in this case. 
THE COURT: Jury's been instructed as to the 
duty and to the arguments of counsel. Go forward. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Thank you. 
MR. SHEFFIELD: Next, the testimony of Ignacio. 
He's admitted to you that he's a drug user for two years. He 
had used that night. And he was looking for more. He sat 
there and told you in no uncertain terms that there's really 
nothing that we could do once he was deported and that, yes, 
he would lie for his friends. 
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, objection, Your Honor. 
There's no evidence to support that assertion. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dellapiana, I'm not going to 
repeat it. Arguments of counsel are not facts. The jury has 
listened to all the evidence and they can weigh the evidence 
and if it's inconsistent with what argument of counsel is 
they are aware that they are the fact finders in this case. 
MR. SHEFFIELD: As for reasonable doubt, you 
have the instruction. You can read it and determine for 
yourself. It's not any doubt. It's reasonable doubt. When you 
look at this defendant's activities that night, in the hall, 
you are entitled to draw your conclusions. What was he 
doing? 
Now where were the drugs? He said that's vitally 
important. The defense wants you to think that that's vitally 
important, in fact an indicator that may be determinative of 
how you should rule. Well, the reason they are in his 
friend's hand is because he has been buying and he admitted 
to buying. That's why they were there. And he was trying to 
buy some more. And that's what he told you. 
Now a lot has been said that Officer Purvis 
couldn't see. Let me ask the court to take judicial notice of 
the fact that this is one gram. The substance in this 
envelope. It says right there on the — . 
THE COURT: I can't read it but the 
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applicability of this case is a mystery to me. I will take 
notice of the fact that that's a sweetener, and that's about 
all I'm going to do. 
MR. SHEFFIELD: Right here it says one gram, the 
amount that's in there. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, absent some foundation 
as to how this is specifically applicable or comparable to 
the evidence — 
THE COURT: Will the attorneys approach? 
(Whereupon, a side bar conference was held at the 
bench.) 
MR. SHEFFIELD: A twist of cocaine is not very 
big. Can it be covered by a hand as he places it in? 
Absolutely. Is that what happened? As plausible as anything 
else. This is not a transaction at a 7-11 store where you put 
your product down and then you offer your money. They open 
the cash register, put it in to make change, then put it back 
for you. It's a fluid activity I think is what Detective 
Purvis said. It happens that quickly. And when the 
participants are there they're going to get what they want as 
quickly as they possibly can. And that's exactly what 
happened, and I'm asking you to convict, find guilty, this 
defendant. 
I'm hesitant to not talk about hiding things or 
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trying to gloss over things but much has been made of the 
money. If I was concerned for a minute about the money being 
an issue in this case I wouldn't have put the officer on the 
stand, knowing full well he hadn't written a report, knowing 
full well he hadn't itemized the denominations. 
That's — he was up there. He told you he made a 
mistake, did not fill out the form as he possibly could have 
and should have, but he also told you that the computer was 
not working. They had received a flyer instruction that he 
couldn't have done it had he wanted to. But he could have 
gone a step further and written them down by himself. He 
didn't do it. But his testimony is still clear there was a 
small amount in his hand when he asked him to put them up 
over his head where he handcuffed him. 
It's clear and he remembers a lot of money being 
folded in his right front pocket. And then there was money 
also in his wallet. 
We're not afraid of the evidence ladies and 
gentlemen. It's there. The pieces go together. We don't have 
to put the whole puzzle together. Each of you have a puzzle 
if you want to draw that analogy. We don't have to put every 
piece there. That's not what we're required to do. Because 
you have life experiences, you have common sense, and you can 
draw conclusions from all the evidence. And that is what 
we're asking you to do. The pieces go together and you can 
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convict• 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sheffield. Aaron. 
Want to come and be sworn. 
(Whereupon, the bailiff was sworn in.) 
THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, I'm 
about to release you to go into your deliberations. I will 
ask you to leave your copies of the jury instructions in here 
for a moment. I'll send them out with the originals as well 
as the one exhibit we've received as well the verdict forms. 
The admonition that I've been telling you for the 
last day and a half no longer exists. In fact it is your duty 
now to go and deliberate, to speak among yourselves, to weigh 
the evidence in this case and to reach a verdict. I cannot 
answer any -- or the bailiff cannot answer any questions. 
All the evidence that you need to make a decision in this 
case you have already. If there are some questions you may 
have for me please put them in writing, give them to Aaron, 
and I will review them with the attorneys. 
With that I'll release you for your deliberations. 
(Whereupon, the jury retired to deliberate at 
11:12 a.m.) 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to ask that 
you make yourselves available. Tell us where you'll be on 
your cell phone, keep it on, stay nearby so we can contact 
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